



## A study on Modi Government's Pragmatic Approach towards Indo-US Strategic Consensus and co-operation in the defense sector

Dr. D. Chandramouli Reddy

Assistant Professor,  
The Department of Political Science and Public Administration  
Sri Krishnadevaraya University, Anantapuram, Andhra Pradesh

**Abstract:** *The nature of India's relations with the United States has changed during the last decade. Since we gained our independence, we have had a tense engagement with "the United States" marked by mutual suspicion, a lack of compassion, and significant philosophical differences. A natural alliance would suggest a fundamental congruence in thought and aspirations that would bring the two nations together, notwithstanding occasional conflicts. The nuclear agreement reached between India and the United States in 2005 allowed for closer cooperation between the two nations than had been possible previously. The deal's completion has eliminated strategic mistrust, paving the way for a significant rise in bilateral cooperation. This paper provides a basis for evaluating India's nuclear sector's prospects in the wake of the nuclear deal, details the challenges encountered by the CLNDA, and provides a high-level overview of the various strategies being considered for addressing the liability issue. Modi reaffirmed it, expressing optimism about the two countries' continuing convergence. The groundwork he laid during his trip to the United States has laid the foundation for the quick and strong expansion of India's and the United States' multifaceted connections in the future years.*

**Keywords:** *Collaboration, Diplomacy, Energy needs, Mistrust, Nuclear deal.*

### Introduction:

Over the last decade, India's relationship with the "United States" has evolved. Our relationship with the "United States" has been tainted by mutual distrust, a lack of sympathy, and fundamental philosophical disagreements ever since we gained independence. People in India have become more critical of the United States in recent years because of its tendency to use its "values" in order to justify interventions & regime change strategies that are otherwise marked by obvious hypocrisy. We have been wary of over-engaging with the United States for fear that it may have excessive power over our various policies. Since our first nuclear test in 1974, the United States has subjected us to sanctions in the vitally important strategic nuclear, missile, and high technology sectors. The actions of the United States in our region, particularly those that pertain to Pakistan, have harmed our sense of safety. Given this context, the turn in recent years toward growing mutual trust and broad-ranging political, economic, and security-related co-operation has been a historic transition. During his trip to India in 2010, "President Barack Obama referred to the relationship between the United States and India as a partnership that would define the 21st century."<sup>[1]</sup> It is difficult to pinpoint exactly what "defining" refers to in this context. This might be seen as an indication that the United States views India as a potential global powerhouse in the near future and that it anticipates the alliance between the world's oldest and greatest democracy and the world's largest & 3rd biggest economy, predicated on their shared ideals of democracy and pluralism, to influence global events in the twenty-first century. This would show that the United States and India can coordinate to determine how international relations are shaped and the rules that govern them, to ensure the best possible management of global commons, and to advance global efforts to harmonize political and moral norms. This may come out as pretty lofty, but such hyperbole is something that Americans are very comfortable with.<sup>[2]</sup>

A natural collaboration would also indicate a fundamental convergence in thought and aims that would drive two nations together, even if there were times when there was a gap between them. This would be the case even if there were times when there was a gap between them. In other words, it would not be reasonable for them to remain separate from one another and maintain a distance since the disparities between them are not basic and can be overcome. Despite all of this, India needs to have a friendship with the United States that is as cordial as is humanly feasible. Due to its superpower position, the United States cannot be disregarded. It is necessary to handle it so one may benefit from the connection while limiting the number of concessions necessary to reach the desired outcome. "The nuclear agreement reached between India and the United States in 2005" opened the door to building a partnership on a far higher level than ever before.<sup>[3]</sup> The conclusion of the transaction resulted in the elimination of strategic mistrust, which led to a great expansion in the scope of bilateral collaboration. However, US non-proliferation



proponents have not stopped trying to increase pressures on India on nuclear problems in order to lay the groundwork for exacting further constraints on “India's ability to develop its nuclear weapon program, especially by connecting our program to those of Pakistan and China.” The nuclear deal kept the non-proliferation question from impeding our bilateral strategy with “the United States” and other major players of the global community. Despite the nuclear agreement's lifting of sanctions on virtually all Indian enterprises and its loosening of restrictions on advanced technologies, this remains the case. “The United States has pledged to back India's membership in all four international organizations that regulate the dissemination of technical information. These organizations are “the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Wassenaar Agreement, and the Australia Group.”<sup>[4]</sup> Political comments, such as President Obama's during “Modi's visit to the United States in September 2014,” reaffirm this backing. Obama said India meets the MTCR standards and is ready for NSG membership, although he did not provide a timeline for this to happen. The United States is reluctant to go to great lengths to stress India's cause after establishing an exemption for India in the NSG. Therefore, the United States has not made any serious efforts to promote India's participation. India's goal is to get the US to keep its strategic pledge as quickly as feasible and to stop the US from using the promise as bargaining leverage to get additional concessions from India on non-proliferation issues. In particular, India will need to focus on administrative procedures for executing the nuclear agreement, which would provide the United States wider access to our nuclear facilities above and beyond IAEA business safeguards. It will need to acquire contracts from the United States for its enterprises. It bothers India that its businesses have not obtained civil nuclear contracts while performing the majority of the work for the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG). Why? Because a legislation that governs our membership, the Nuclear Liability Act, has openly lobbied for a reform that would make U.S. suppliers accountable for certain conduct under specific situations. “Support for India's NSG membership may be tied to real opportunities for its corporations to build nuclear power facilities in India and a resolution to the persistent problem of national tracking.”<sup>[5]</sup> The issue of India's commitment to buy “nuclear reactors from General Electric and Westinghouse” that would create 10,000 megawatts of electricity has been raised by the United States on every high-level visit that has occurred since the nuclear pact.

### **The Obama Administration and Indo-American Defense Collaboration**

The present phase of US–India relations started after the exclusion efforts implemented by the Clinton administration in response to India's nuclear tests in 1998 were unsuccessful in isolating India.<sup>[6]</sup> The Indian government, led by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, emerged from these sanctions as a stronger and more prosperous nation. Following adopting a strategy of accommodation by the United States towards India, the two nations could turn their formerly alienated ties into a strategic alliance.<sup>[7]</sup> After Modi was elected “to power, he did not let his disputes with the United States” determine how relations between the two countries were handled. Instead, Modi decided to concentrate efforts on maintaining and expanding existing connections. “This was made quite clear to everyone during Prime Minister Modi's state visit to the United States, which took place in September 2014 at the request of President Obama. Subsequently, Obama was invited to be the chief guest at the Republic Day Parade in New Delhi in January 2015,”<sup>[8]</sup> making him the first president of the United States to do so. Both countries have benefited from their collaboration in military matters. “Given the downturn in its economic development and the security challenges in the Asia Pacific region, the Middle East, and other locations, there is a growing perception within US security officials and experts that the United States cannot deliver peace & security on its own.” It's important to work with developing countries like India.

As a result of the “Modi government's” efforts to speed up the military modernization process, which has been supported by rising foreign direct investment in the defense industry, Washington views strengthening defense relations with New Delhi as a potential source of economic opportunity. “The emergence of China and its aggressive posturing in the South China Sea is another cause for the United States to deepen its security and military connections with India. These developments have occurred as China has become more powerful.”<sup>[9]</sup> The developing link between Beijing & Islamabad was a source of worry for India, as was China's attitude toward disputed regions. New Delhi is under the impression that having a permanent military presence in South Asia from the United States will assist in keeping the regional power dynamic in its favor. The Modi administration knows that to pursue military modernization aggressively, it needs access to the most cutting-edge weapons and technology the United States has.<sup>[10]</sup> “The United States of America and the Republic of India have both achieved great headway in the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI),” which is an endeavor that aims to reduce the obstacles that prevent collaboration and trade in defense technology. Additionally, discussions are taking place between the two nations on the possible sale of fighter planes with the “F-16 and F/A-18 designations to the Indian Air Force.” The ‘Make in India’ initiative would get a major boost from the conclusion of these defense purchases.

Additionally, the administration of Narendra Modi has worked toward establishing significant bilateral agreements: “the Communication and Information Security Memorandum and the Logistic Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMA).” The



previous administration led by the UPA was opposed to these three accords because they would compromise India's policy of nonalignment as well as India's strategic autonomy. Newly emerging threats to national security have led to the Modi administration's tentative approval of both proposals. Because of LEMA, both countries' armed forces will have easier access to fuel and supplies kept at the other's facilities, which will make coordinating their operations considerably less complicated. The pact will help India's activities in the Indian Ocean and its efforts to increase its maritime influence in the Asia-Pacific region. The nations who are members of LEMA will be able to use sophisticated encryption methods to exchange sensitive information during peace and conflict. Concerns about the potential drawbacks of "signing these agreements" have been expressed. For example, LEMA would allow the United States to eavesdrop on sensitive defense-related discussions that take place inside India. "Some have also voiced concern that the United States would use LEMA as leverage to get India to set aside some of its land bases for exclusive military use. India has only agreed to the agreements in principle due to all of these reasons. The Narendra Modi government has asked the Trump administration to revise the deals so that India's independence and military are not compromised. Manohar Parrikar, the Indian minister of defence, has made it quite clear that LEMA makes no mention of the presence of American troops in India proper. India may be wary because its government does not want to be dragged into a battle between the United States and China, despite its desire for tight military relations with the United States. In spite of India's desire for closer military relations with the US, this is the case. With the passage of the US-India Defense Technology and Partnership Act in March 2016 and Modi's anticipated visit to Washington to meet a joint session of the US Congress, the future of the bilateral relationship seems bright. As these kinds of meetings pave the way for a tighter collaboration between India and the United States, they should continue. <sup>[11]</sup>

Over the previous two years, the administration of Narendra Modi has unquestionably accomplished a great deal in cultivating constructive relations between India & the United States. The Prime Minister of India has personally engaged in aggressive efforts to cultivate relationships with key political figures in the United States. Within the first 24 months of his presidency, he had six separate encounters with President Obama and made three trips to the United States. Because of the closeness of their friendship, the President of the most powerful nation in the world felt compelled to send a letter of endorsement for him to be included in Time magazine's list of the 100 most influential people in the world in 2015. The level of interaction between top "leaders in India and the United States" has also recently increased. Ashton Carter, the Secretary of Defense for the United States, has already had four meetings with Nirmala Sitharaman, the Minister of Defense for India, in only the previous two years. John Kerry, the Secretary of State, has made two trips to India and has had many meetings with Sushma Swaraj, the Indian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Several powerful Americans in the US.

Members of several congressional committees have been to India as well. "Senator John McCain and three cabinet members" traveled to India in the first few months of the administration of that new government to participate in talks about the bilateral relationship. This came about as a result of trips made by Senators Angus King and Tim Kaine, both members of "the Senate Intelligence and Armed Services Committees, respectively, and the head of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on South and Central Asian Affairs, respectively. Since then, many high-level visits from the United States have persisted," maintaining a consistent engagement with Indian officials and leaders. This pattern has picked up significant steam since President Obama's trip to India in January of last year, during which he served as the principal guest at the ceremonies commemorating India's Republic Day.<sup>[12]</sup> It is abundantly obvious that there have been tremendous gains made in the degree of political engagement shared by the two countries.

The rate at which defense relations are progressing has likewise remained unchanged. For some time now, the United States has held India's position as the nation with which it has carried out the greatest number of joint military drills.<sup>[13]</sup> The difficulty and level of sophistication of this interaction are both increasing. Concerns over the joint creation and manufacture of military hardware have also gained some traction as of late, although the two years passed have yielded limited advancements on this front. There has been discussion of shifting focus to other, more delicate technologies, but so far, only a few low-end projects have been undertaken. Researching portable hybrid electric power sources and designing improved protective clothing are two examples. The parties' recent signing of the "Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA)" is a significant milestone on the road to greater cooperation, as it demonstrates that administrative and other practical obstacles have been successfully navigated. With this agreement in place, both parties may rely on the other for maintenance and supply. It is encouraging that the Pentagon has established the India Rapid Response Unit, the first such unit dedicated to a single nation. The sale of military hardware is also important to the bilateral defense relationship between the United States and India. With a military trade volume that surpassed \$5 billion dollars in the previous decade, "India has emerged as one of the most significant export destinations for the US defense sector in recent years." After scaling down an agreement to purchase French Rafal jets, India is giving "the Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet" a second look. This development can significantly increase the size of the



Indian market for items manufactured in the United States of America. There has been no formal statistics announcement yet, and the contract may take years to produce real effects. According to some cautious estimates, India would be interested in purchasing between 100 and 150 Boeing planes shortly. If this transaction is successful, it can usher in a qualitatively distinct relationship between buyer and seller, namely, the relationship of co-producers. This shift in mindset might be partially attributed to the current Indian administration, which Narendra Modi leads.

#### **A Civilian Nuclear Agreement between India and the United States:**

India and the United States have announced a policy-negotiated settlement on two key issues, which will pave the way for a nuclear trade compliant with domestic and international laws. This announcement brings to an end a six-year stalemate in the process of operationalizing the ground-breaking civil nuclear agreement. During their combined contact with the media, President Obama said there was a “breakthrough” in the civil nuclear agreement, in which both parties resolved the two outstanding difficulties. The nuclear liability regulations in India, which state that equipment suppliers are responsible for any damages caused by their products, were a source of anxiety for American businesses. In addition, they have requested that the United States and any other nations that provide fuel for the planned nuclear power facilities be tracked. While India has said it would deal with the nuclear liability problem within the IAEA’s safeguards, the country has announced that it will form an insurance pool to address the issue of nuclear liability. Apart from the main push in the civil nuclear field, Modi and Obama inaugurated the Defense Technology & Trade Initiative and published a 59-point declaration covering the whole gamut of the co-operation. A joint declaration of friendship between India and the United States was released in Delhi under “Shared Effort, Progress for All.”<sup>[14]</sup> This declaration was in accordance with both countries’ national ideals. It included commitments to have frequent summits with greater periodicity, elevate strategic engagement, “create hotlines between the Prime Minister of India and the President of the United States of America, as well as national security advisors, and cooperate to form joint ventures on strategically vital projects. The nuclear accord between India and the United States is a historic agreement that may bring India into the mainstream of non-proliferation efforts.” The agreement brought up significant concerns over the future of the framework governing nuclear non-proliferation. Whether or whether the agreement strikes a fair balance “between India’s long-term energy and security objectives and the desire of the international community to isolate as much of India’s nuclear reactors as possible from potential military” uses is still hotly contested. There is a widespread belief in India that the country is being coerced into relinquishing its sovereignty in some way. This view is prevalent in some parts of the country. Everything relies on the “supply,” meaning that there won’t be any protections if there isn’t any supply. As a result, placing some of the nuclear plants used for civilian purposes under permanent safeguards would not present as many challenges as one might expect. However, important strategic centers like Trombay and Kalpakkam need not be included in the IAEA safeguards system at any cost. This would be in everyone’s best interest. Likewise, “the third and fourth heavy water reactors at Tarapur” should each produce 540 MW of electricity. Because of this, the fast breeder development program and “the work necessary for the country’s three-stage civilian nuclear power plant” will be able to go forward. The agreement that was reached in July 2005 and the separation plan that was developed in March 2006 does not put a limit on India’s strategic agenda. “Since the nuclear weapons program will no longer be included in the civilian power program,” maybe the political establishment will have a clearer understanding of how much the nuclear weapons program costs now that it is being separated. This may result in a strategic stance that is more responsible, and it might also help prevent a “nuclear arms race in South Asia.” Since “India does not have vast quantities of plutonium,” it is possible that its military’s requirements justify its decision to withhold information. All the facilities were theoretically available for India’s weapons development until the deal was signed. Only 35% of the whole is permitted at this time. Despite the fact that India has accessibility to fissile materials, not all of those components are used for weapon manufacturing. Imagine if a country like China, which has strained ties with the U.S., is able to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful uses without giving up its nuclear weapons development. If that’s the case, India’s denial of access stands out as odd. Despite India’s impeccable reputation, this is the case. As a consequence of the deal, India may become more reliant on foreign oil, increasing its susceptibility to pressure. Because of this, it would be in India’s best interest to switch to reliance on thorium, a process that may take twenty or thirty years. Therefore, as of right now, “India would need a sufficient foundation of heavy water and light water reactors to generate sufficient quantities of plutonium to start a series of fast breeder reactors.” If there are disruptions in the gasoline supply, India will need to take remedial actions to cope with the situation. This will need to be included in the agreement with the IAEA.

The agreement in July 2005 envisioned modifying regulations in the United States to facilitate “full civil nuclear energy” co-operation and commerce with India. But what we are seeing right now is incomplete. The Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh, has made it clear on multiple occasions that his country will not accept anything less than “full civil nuclear energy co-operation.” Together, we would have access to the whole nuclear fuel cycle, including the ability to synthesise spent fuel. “The Indian government is hoping that the 123 Agreement would adequately resolve India’s concerns as the Henry Hyde US-India Nuclear Cooperation Act” does not give India these rights.<sup>[15]</sup> The United States may have the upper hand if they have their way on the matter of “in-perpetuity” safeguards, even if Indian officials claim to have hacked in an escape mechanism in case fuel



sources are shut off. The United States does not permit either the reprocessing of its supply or the return of wasted fuel to the country. Both of these practices are prohibited. India does not want a situation similar to that in Tarapur, where they were forced to deal with stockpiles of used tiller, which are dangerous and very costly to maintain. “The United States of America has waived this provision for Japan, Switzerland, and the European Union”; India may be anticipating that it will also be exempted from this need for its ease. The questions about the sequencing of each side have resolved themselves to continue being asked. The Prime Minister of India has given an unequivocal assurance that Indian plants would not be subject to safeguards until all constraints imposed by “the United States and the Nuclear Suppliers Group” have been “irreversibly withdrawn.” There are still two sequencing difficulties that need to be resolved: First, we don't have a good idea of when the "Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)" criteria will be updated. Second, Indian negotiators think that the safeguards arrangement with the IAEA should be completed once "the US-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (the 123 Agreement)" is completed. This belief stems from Indian negotiators' belief this would be the most beneficial course of action.

### **US–India Relations Under Trump Are Built on a Rock-Solid Foundation of Strategic Partnership:**

The new United States government takes office during a period in which ties between Washington, the District of Columbia, and New Delhi are at an all-time high. During the second term of “President Barack Obama,” significant progress was accomplished, particularly after Narendra Modi won office in India in May of 2014. These world leaders met nine times at various multilateral summits and exchanged state visits reciprocally. Since Donald Trump unexpectedly won the election for the presidency of the “United States, there has been a great deal of expectation for the meeting between the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, and the President of the United States, Donald Trump.” The long-awaited meeting between the two heads of state took place in June 2017, and it focused on key matters relating to the economy and the country's security. “It was anticipated that the Indo-US civil nuclear deal would be discussed at today's meeting between “Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Donald Trump; however, an agreement between the NPCIL and Westinghouse to construct six power reactors in Andhra Pradesh is not likely to be inked. According to official sources present here, during the understanding between the presidents of the world's two greatest democracies, a wide range of strategic problems are anticipated to be addressed. One of these subjects is the progress made on the civil nuclear agreement that was struck in 2008.”<sup>[16]</sup> They said that the primary barriers to “the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited's (NPCIL)” hesitation to sign the deal with the American nuclear behemoth were a financial crisis at Westinghouse and the lack of an operating reference atomic plant. In 2015, Modi and Barack Obama, serving as the President of the United States, issued a joint statement in which they reaffirmed their commitment to finalizing the contractual agreement by June 2017.<sup>[17]</sup>

On the other hand, a lot of time has passed, and “a lot of water has flowed under the bridge since then. In March, Westinghouse, purchased by the Japanese company Toshiba the previous year,” filed a bankruptcy petition. The “Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL)” are unlikely to go forward with any arrangement with the struggling corporation until it emerges from the current financial predicament. “In 2008, an agreement for nuclear co-operation between India and the United States was struck. According to the terms of the deal, Westinghouse and GE Hitachi were to construct six power reactors each in Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat. After receiving the Mithi Virdi site in Gujarat, Westinghouse was offered the Kovvada site in the Srikakulam district of Andhra Pradesh.” Both of these locations are in the state of Gujarat. At Kovvada, the corporation intended to construct six AP1000 atomic reactors, each of which would have had a capacity of 1,208 MW. Our newly altered relationship, which demonstrated a new level of trust, revolved around the civil nuclear accord as its central pillar. Additionally, it opened up new potential for economic growth and broadened the range of renewable energy sources available to us. The White House, for its part, has informed American media outlets separately that the agreement on the civil nuclear program satisfies US objections on both tracking and responsibility and that it would be up to US corporations to evaluate the market. General Electric and Westinghouse are two companies competing to offer nuclear reactors to two parks in the United States that were allotted to the country before. The fact that there has been forward movement on the nuclear issue as a result of specific directives from the political establishment on either side was affirmed by the Foreign Secretary, who stated that they played a significant role in the chain of events that led to the advancement of the situation on this front. “The United States and India” have announced a “joint strategic vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region” to promote regional economic integration via expedited infrastructural connectivity and protect maritime security by guaranteeing freedom of passage and overflight across the region, notably in the South China Sea.<sup>[18]</sup>

- The Prime Minister has calmed the country by promising "complete civil nuclear co-operation," which would provide India the opportunity to acquire nuclear fuel-cycle technologies. which the Senate bill failed to pass because it included;
- the partitioning of India's nuclear plants into civilian and military sectors as part of an initiative the country has adopted; and



- As a result of the structure of “the safeguards agreement that it has with the IAEA,” India has said that it would not allow nuclear inspectors from the United States to access its nuclear facilities (fallback safeguards).

The passage of time is the sole factor that can reveal whether or not the agreement will result in a positive outcome for either party. There is no way that the conclusion of the agreement won't have an effect, both immediately and in the long run, on the relationship “between New Delhi and Washington.” The destiny of the contract will be determined by the success of the discussions about 123. On the Indian side, this task has to be accomplished without sacrificing our energy requirements or our national sovereignty beyond a certain degree. The passage of time is the only factor that can reveal whether or not the nuclear agreement marks a paradigm change in the relationship between India and the United States.

### **An Analysis of the Nuclear Agreement between India and the United States**

The completion of “the Indo-US nuclear co-operation agreement in 2008” in a way that was both effective and on schedule aroused huge expectations for the fast expansion of India's nuclear energy industry. After a protracted period of post-Chornobyl sluggishness, the nuclear power sector was going through a period of a resurgence as the nuclear deal was being negotiated throughout the globe. The so-called “nuclear deal” lifted the embargoes placed on selling nuclear reactors & fuel for India's nuclear program for over two decades. These embargoes had been a significant barrier in the way of the “country's nuclear power sector reaching its full-blown potential.” It was generally anticipated that eliminating this long-standing barrier would lead to a fast growth of “India's nuclear energy program” when it was accomplished. Despite the passage of six years, “India's nuclear energy program” has not yet made significant progress in expanding its nuclear power capacity. On the other hand, India's aspirations to expand its use of nuclear energy have been presented with a new challenge due to a legal standstill about providers' obligations after the passage of “India's Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA)” in 2010. Due to certain sections of this legislation, the United States of America and other major suppliers, including Russia and France, have been significantly dissuaded from engaging in commercial agreements with India to sell nuclear reactors. In the last several years, the United States and India have participated in several discussions to find a solution to the impasse about the supplier's responsibility problem that is acceptable to both parties. The United States administration is optimistic that it will be able to resolve its concerns with India's legal system about liability law now that a new government has taken office in New Delhi. For this reason, the impending summit between Prime Minister Modi & President Obama, which is set to take place on September 29 and 30, is essential for settling the outstanding difficulties in Indo-American nuclear co-operation. For expediting the signing of “the techno-commercial agreement between Westinghouse and Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited, Prime Minister Modi is expected to meet with representatives of the American nuclear sector to address their worries about potential liability (NPCIL).” This article lays out the framework for comprehending the evolution of India's nuclear industry after the nuclear agreement, illustrates the challenges encountered “by the CLNDA, and defines the broad outlines of the alternative options being investigated for addressing the liability issue.” [19]

“At the time of the signing of the Indo-U.S. nuclear co-operation agreement, India pledged to create a robust regulatory framework to enhance nuclear safety,” pass domestic responsibility laws to govern the acquisition of reactors and components from both international and domestic suppliers, and provide immediate compensation to victims of any nuclear tragedy. There was widespread hope that India would establish a local nuclear liability system to protect “both domestic and foreign suppliers from responsibility in the event of a catastrophe” and so boost participation in the industry necessary to realize the country's planned nuclear development. Additionally, India committed to “sign and ratify the Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC)” as part of the nuclear deal between India & the United States. Each state that ratifies this convention agrees to adopt a liability legislation within its borders that conforms to a model text. This pledge was made by India as part of the nuclear accord. According to the CSC, the operator of a nuclear site has “total” and “sole” responsibility, “freeing the suppliers from any accountability. Although India formally entered into the CSC on December 21, 2010,” the nation has failed to ratify the agreement, even though more than four years have passed since the signature.

### **Conclusion**

Because of the outcomes of the visit, the Indian government's foreign policy establishment has every reason to be optimistic. Considering all the unknowns before the trip, it was quite satisfying to see how things turned out. Modi's faith in the rising convergence between the two countries was confirmed in an opinion article he wrote for the Wall Street Journal, in which he alluded to his comment about handling and overcoming the “hesitations of history” during his speech to the Congress of the United States of America a year ago. His visit to the United States paved the way for the future development of robust and varied ties between India and the United States.



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